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    <copyright>Blackledge</copyright>
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      <title>Where Are We Going ?</title>
      <link>/classic/BSL/Papers/Entries/2011/11/13_Where_Are_We_Going.html</link>
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      <pubDate>Sun, 13 Nov 2011 09:21:15 -0600</pubDate>
      <description>We can talk to our device now.  Is this where Apple is going?</description>
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      <itunes:duration>00:08:40</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:subtitle>We can talk to our device now.  Is this where Apple is going?</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:summary>We can talk to our device now.  Is this where Apple is going?</itunes:summary>
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      <title>Fast Look at Weekly Options</title>
      <link>/classic/BSL/Papers/Entries/2011/5/31_Fast_Look_at_Weekly_Options.html</link>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 31 May 2011 14:34:37 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;br/&gt;Something appears to give the weekly options to much power to control end of the week option strike prices.  As the weeks go by, this results in absolute control of the momentum of a given stock for an extended period of time.</description>
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      <title>Transatmospheric  Interceptor</title>
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      <pubDate>Sun, 22 May 2011 11:41:26 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;br/&gt;Aggressive and robust kinetic energy weapon systems for use in boost phase interception of weapons of mass destruction requires exploitation of technology and utilization of system concepts far beyond the twenty year old concepts demonstrated to date by the Missile Defense Agency. This proposal details a plan for logically and legitimately bringing forth an appropriate system design and an approach for developing the technology and testing necessary for demonstrating the resulting boost phase missile defense weapon.</description>
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      <title>Pan Pacific Range</title>
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      <pubDate>Fri, 16 Feb 2007 07:02:52 -0600</pubDate>
      <description>The effectiveness of jointness should exist throughout the weapon system development chain.  Although this in some quarters stifles innovation it is the path the nation has chosen to take.  The services which fight together should develop and test together.  This brief was prepared for the Missile Defense Agency which has the first deployed tri service weapon system for missile defense.  It first proposed linking the vast Air Force, Army and Navy Pacific test assets into a centrally controlled and executed Pan Pacific Missile Defense test range. </description>
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      <title>Science Acquisition Issues</title>
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      <pubDate>Sun, 24 Sep 2006 18:45:40 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>During the downsizing of the government laboratories the depositories of the country’s technical expertise were dismantled.  While contractors are responsible and talented, they too are dismantled on three year centers as contract awards come and go.  Every three years is is a brand new day with all acquired knowledge again lost.  Unfortunately this has occurred during a period of explosive growth in communication and computer technologies. We are now forced to buy legacy systems which the new engineers and scientist simply have no interest.   Unless we again attain a government knowledge base for smart buying of new systems we are on the slippery slope of war fighting intellectual and capability decay.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;../Science_Acquisition_Issues.html&quot;&gt;Download&lt;/a&gt;</description>
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      <title>History of Missile Defense</title>
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      <pubDate>Mon, 11 Sep 2006 23:28:11 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;br/&gt;A History of the SDIO and BMDO&lt;br/&gt;This chronicles the transition of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization into the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization which started the programs for Theater Missile Defense, National Missile Defense, and Technology Readiness.  These programs will continue under the renamed Missile Defense Agency.  The program has transitioned from the early Strategic Defense System commonly referred to as Star Wars, through a concept for Global Protection Against Limited Strikes and on to the current acquisition program which has a strong Theater Missile Defense emphasis.  These changes are overlaid against the geo-political issues that necessarily formed the growth to the latest system structure. The scientific and political obstacles faced by the program, and the advanced technology achievements experienced as the program progressed are discussed.  A UK assessment of the likely way forward and the potential for success of a future ballistic missile defense and the roles of the UK in past, present and future relationships with the USA and ballistic missile defenses are also presented.&lt;br/&gt;Background&lt;br/&gt;The Ballistic Missile Age began in September 1944 when the first German V-2 ballistic missile exploded in London. The V2 carried a 1000 kilogram high explosive warhead and was the forerunner to the now globally deployed Soviet SCUD short range ballistic missile. V2s were used extensively with thousands launched at both London and Antwerp. Post war studies of Germany's missile program also uncovered a plan to strike New York City with what would have been the world's first Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile, which was to have been ready by 1946 had the war no t&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;   Ballistic Missile Reentry&lt;br/&gt;ended when it did.  During the Superpower arms race of the 1950s and 1960s, the terrifying marriage of long range ballistic missile to the small, but most powerfuadvanced technology atomic and hydrogen bomb warheads, had been achieved. These weapons were deployed in numbers of tens of thousands as the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction was accepted by both the Superpowers.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;      Atomic Blast Close Up&lt;br/&gt;Beyond these events, the race to better the weapons in the 1970s, had improved missile accuracy to the point that explosive, chemical, and biological weapons had returned to the list of deliverable terror warheads. Cost of development of these weapons had reduced to the point that that they began and are now entering the inventories of third world nations. Anyone with the will, can now build or buy and fly such a missile&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Hydrogen Blast Far Off&lt;br/&gt;One of the first attempts at developing a defense against ballistic missiles was a UK scheme whereby anti-aircraft artillery was concentrated in a section of the sky through which the V2 was expected to pass. The idea was abandoned, when it was realized that both friendly and enemy debris falling back on London might cause more widespread damage and alarm than the V2 itself. Counter force operations against the V2 were equally unsuccessful and talk of deterrence has subsequently been the only defense against ballistic missiles. These issues remain to day as bottom line centerpieces in rational discussions of ballistic missile defense.  The USA had since the post war period, been active in missile defense. By the mid 1950s, intelligence reports of Soviet ballistic missile developments had prompted the various agencies of the USA to increase their interest in the subject. A number of early studies provided an assessment of the potential for one missile to intercept another. A feat which ultimately the studies and early experiments confirmed was possible.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Missile Defeats Missile &lt;br/&gt;Significant progress in missile guidance and control achieved during the late 1950s and early 1960s, further strengthened the possibility of building a defensive missile. The launch of the Soviet Sputnik satellite in 1957 prompted the USA Department of Defense to establish the Advanced Research Projects Agency to manage US advanced space and missile efforts. While these activities were eventually passed to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the USA military services, the new agency was given new responsibilities, one of which included a &amp;quot;Project Defender&amp;quot;. This program was to establish what could be done to defend against ballistic missile attack. The Defender program subsequently presented a broad array of concepts including hit to kill interceptors known as kinetic energy weapons, directed energy weapons utilizing laser and electron beams, and weapons with tailored nuclear effects. The country's progress was such that by July 1962 a NIKE-ZEUS missile had successfully approached a high velocity reentry vehicle to within a nuclear tipped interceptor kill radius.  By the late 1960's the USA began deploying a missile defense system designated SAFEGUARD. The system formed a layered defense using SPARTAN and SPRINT missiles as two nuclear tipped interceptors. SPARTAN covered the long range exo-atmospheric engagements and SPRINT addressed the threat at shorter ranges which occurred lower in the endo atmosphere. The original plans called for deployment of the system at several sites, but in the end only the facility at Grand Forks, North Dakota was activated to protect the land based Air Force ballistic missile fields.  In the context of an arms race, the system had a number of potential problems associated with it. Its infrastructure of radars could be distroyed by a large enemy attack and fratricide from its' defending interceptors. The signing of the 1972 Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty and the 1974 ABM Treaty Protocol agreement limited any system to 100 interceptors, based at a single site. The subsequent realization that Soviet warheads could overwhelm the SAFEGUARD site resulted in its being decommissioned. In re-posturing, the USA, directed the Army to concentrate its efforts on a research and development program to solve the technical problems highlighted by the experience with the SAFEGUARD system. By the early 1980s technology had advanced to the point where the USA was on the verge of revolutionizing ballistic missile defense with a capability to use a non-nuclear hit to kill interceptor for ballistic missile defense.  In the meantime both Superpowers had made significant progress in readying their infrastructure for inclusion of ballistic missile defenses. The USSR had established an ostensibly treaty compliant ABM system using nuclear tipped interceptors to protect Moscow. The USA had set into place an early warning capability, a feature considered essential to any ABM system. A series of Defense Support Program satellites, which used infrared sensors to detect missiles in the boosting phase of their flight were put into place at geo-syncronous orbit. They alson deployed a chain of treaty compliant radars known as Ballistic Missile Early Warning System. One is located in the UK on Fylindales Moor, and is manned by staff of the UK Royal Air Force and operated in conjunction with Canada and the USA. The other two radars, Clear in Alaska, and Thule in Greenland, were USA operated.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Surveillance Satellite&lt;br/&gt;As non-nuclear interceptor hit to kill technology was reaching maturity, Ronald Reagan had become President of the USA. President Reagan had studied the feature of the nuclear threat throughout his political campaigns and had reached the conclusion that Mutual Assured Destruction was fundamentally against the nations ideals. Not only was it truly &amp;quot;MAD&amp;quot;, but he considered the theat of such a non-human total response to be &amp;quot;immoral&amp;quot; in the strictest sense of the word.&lt;br/&gt;Advocates of active ballistic missile defense seized the opportunity to nurture in the new President an inclination to intensity the missile defense program. Of particular importance were the contributions of Edward Teller of the Department of Energy National Laboratories and Daniel Graham of the High Frontier Foundation. Thus the scene was set of President Reagan's now famous &amp;quot;Star Wars&amp;quot; speech delivered on 23 March 1983, in which he effectively called upon the USA to intensify and expand its work on ballistic missile defense in a program which he was to call the Strategic Defense Initiative.&lt;br/&gt;In his keynote speech, on Defense Spending and Strategic Defense, President Reagan challenged the scientific community of the USA to investigate whether new technologies could provide the means for countering the awesome threat of nuclear ballistic missiles. He directed a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long term research and development program to begin to achieve that goal. In so doing he presented his vision of a future in which nations could live secure in the knowledge that their national security did not rest upon the threat of nuclear retaliation, but on the power of negotiation and an active ballistic missile defense based on USA superior technology.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;The SDIO Shield&lt;br/&gt;President Reagan was perceived by many as having offered the hope of a world made safe from the threat of nuclear holocaust. This fueled speculation that the proposed Strategic Defense Initiative could pave the way for arms control measures that could eventually eliminate the nuclear weapons all together.&lt;br/&gt;By April 1983 President Reagan had signed a national security directive mandating that two intensive studies be carried out to provide a plan for program definition. One addressed the the policy implication of developing defense technologies, and the other, the Defense Technology Study, considered the proper technology required for ballistic missile defense.&lt;br/&gt;The Defense Technology Study chaired by James Fletcher, formerly a NASA Administrator, produced the Fletcher Report which proved to be the most influential and formed the basic structure upon which the program was eventually established. The report provided the first insight into what an effective missile defense system had to accomplish in order to intercept a strategic ballistic missile. A detailed inventory of the current state of the art was produced for technology in eight general areas of missile defense. These included categories of: surveillance, acquisition, and tracking; directed energy weapons; conventional weapons; system concepts; battle management, command, control, and communication; survivability; lethality; and threat vulnerability.&lt;br/&gt;In January 1984, the President issued another national security directive establishing the Strategic Defense Initiative, which was to be a focused program to demonstrate the technical feasibility of enhancing deterrence and thereby reducing the risk of nuclear war through a greater reliance on defensive capabilities. The program was also to include the development of a plan for early deployment, because of fears that the USSR would attempt to break out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.&lt;br/&gt;Lt. Gen. Abrahamson, a popular Air Force officer known for his technical abilities, was named as the first Director of the newly formed Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO). The Charter for the SDIO was formally promulgated in February 1986, and it stated:&lt;br/&gt;&amp;quot;SDIO shall manage and direct the conduct of a vigorous research program, including advanced technologies, that will provide the basis for an informed decision regarding the feasibility of eliminating the threat posed by nuclear ballistic missiles of all ranges, and of increasing the contribution of defensive systems to US and allied security.&amp;quot;&lt;br/&gt;Both the new SDI program and organization included the original eight areas defined in the Fletcher Report, but were rearranged into five broader program elements which were: surveillance, acquisition, tracking, and kill assessment (SATKA); directed energy weapons (DEW); kinetic energy weapons (KEW); survivability, lethality, and key technologies (SLKT); and systems concepts and battle management (SYS). The intention was also not to confine SDI to the USA, but to invite participation from allied countries, which ultimately led to the UK setting up its own Strategic Defense Initiative Participation Office (SDIPO) in 1985. This was the start of what was and continues to be a special relationship between the USA and UK ballistic missile defense communities.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Flight Test Vehicle&lt;br/&gt;The program was established at a time when the Soviet Union was investing heavily in both defensive and offensive missile systems, including anti-satellite systems. The initial SDIO requirement faced the threat of a massed Soviet strategic ballistic missile strike which would contain sophisticated counter measures against the ballistic missile defense system. The development task faced by SDIO was formidable since new system was to protect or to alleviate significantly the potentially catastrophic effects of such an attack.&lt;br/&gt;The flight of a ballistic missile can be considered for convenience and by technological insight, as comprising four phases which are: boost, post boost, midcourse, and terminal. Each of these phases offer different opportunities and challenges to a necessarily high technology defensive architecture. In order to provide an effective defense, SDIO aimed for a concept which would provide multiple tiers of defense, to counter the offense at each phase until at the very worst just a fraction of warheads would manage to survive to have little or no significant military impact. Civilian populations were still at risk in even the most robust schemes.&lt;br/&gt;By 1986 the SDI budget was being estimated at Three billion dollars per year, and several important experiments had been completed providing some confidence that missile defense was indeed technically feasible and that the principles behind the hit-to-kill interceptor were sound. The proper technology programs were put in place and were having success at making them affordable. In addition SDIO had developed a missile defense architecture. This conceptual structure was used to establish performance criteria for different weapon system combinations of surveillance and interceptors. The philosophy was that once these components were developed, the architecture would become the blueprint for their integration into a coherent missile defense system.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Night Launch&lt;br/&gt;As 1986 drew to a close SDIO achievements were such that the Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger and the President were able to direct the SDIO to submit a missile defense system concept for review by the Defense Acquisition Board of the Pentagon. This concept became known as the Strategic Defense System (SDS) Phase One and depended up on an architecture based on kinetic energy interceptors. Other phases involving directed energy weapons expected to follow after the successful deployment of the SDS Phase One system. The SDS Phase One architecture contained these major elements of missile defense:&lt;br/&gt;	•	        a boost surveillance and tracking system (BSTS),&lt;br/&gt;	•	        a space based interceptor (SBI) system,&lt;br/&gt;	•	        a battle management (BMC3) system,&lt;br/&gt;	•	        a space-based surveillance and tracking system (SSTS), and&lt;br/&gt;	•	        an exo-atmospheric ground based interceptor system (GBI)&lt;br/&gt;The SDS Phase One was considered and treated as a system of system elements. When combined in accordance with the SDS Phase One architectural concept these elements would have formed a multi-tiered defense that had a capability to destroy Soviet Union missiles and reentry nuclear warheads at anytime during their time of flight. By September of 1987 the Secretary of Defense approved the resulting recommendation that these elements should be authorized to proceed into a Department of Defense Demonstration and Validation Phase for a ballistic missile defense system.&lt;br/&gt;At this time the second Director of SDIO, Lt. Gen. Monahan of the Air Force, was selected to guide the program into this first acquisition cycle.&lt;br/&gt;As the program progressed, two major concerns in the SDS Phase One architecture emerged. It was costly, and the space based elements could be vulnerable to attack by Soviet ASATs. The vulnerability issue was centered around a spaced based platform containing ten interceptors. It was reasoned that a single ASAT employed against a SBI would be capable of achieving a ten to one kill ratio and any proliferation race would thereby be lost. The engineering community did not yet recognize that properly utilized technology for building the space based interceptors had narrowed the cost exchange ratio to nearly one to one. However, an even more robust answer to this perceived problem was not long in coming.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Miniaturization Technology&lt;br/&gt;With the suggestion of the internal SDIO technology directorate that the cost and vulnerability issues could be overcome by developing small, autonomous interceptors called singlets. New sensors and already demonstrated powerful miniature onboard computers would allow them to intercept Soviet Union ballistic missiles with little or even no support from satellites or ground based radars. The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory subsequently took this idea and developed it into a concept of stand alone, interceptors, which because of the operational concept, computing capacity and ten to twenty kilogram small size quickly became known as Brilliant Pebbles, a more poetic name than &amp;quot;Singlets&amp;quot;.&lt;br/&gt;Subsequent analysis of the Brilliant Pebbles concept confirmed that it could indeed provide the answer to both the cost and vulnerability problems associated with the original SDS Phase One system. Its size and potential to be widely dispersed throughout space would make it a very difficult target for Soviet ASATs, which would result in an unacceptable kill cost ratio. As self contained replaceable units, Brilliant Pebbles would not require the kind of high cost support projected for a revisited space based interceptor platform. Plans for the mass production of the Brilliant Pebbles was seen as another major cost saver for the program.&lt;br/&gt;By the end of the 1980s the Brilliant Pebble concept was considered to be the central element of the SDS Phase One architecture. It triggered other major changes, principally the elimination of the requirement for a boost surveillance and tracking system and brought into question the need for any space based surveillance and tracking system at all. Intensive studies and debate confirmed that the Brilliant Pebbles element was by far the only affordable alternative for providing an effective defense against the massive Soviet threat.&lt;br/&gt;Although simple, the Brilliant Pebble spaced based interceptor system; flew in the face of various weapons in space policy makers. However; it remains to this day, the most effective weapon against ballistic missile threats at all levels of deployment. Fundamentally, it would be in place for a surprise attack and the consequences of its operation against the boost phase of a ballistic missile, would disperse chemical, biological and nuclear debris back onto the aggressor nation.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Lethality Assured&lt;br/&gt;As these changes to the architecture were coming to light, remarkable and significant geopolitical events were beginning to have a major impact on SDIO and the USA national defense issues overall. The final year of the decade of the 1980s saw the collapse of the Soviet Union's control over eastern Europe. Two years later, Boris Yeltsin would overthrow Mikhael Gorbachev and thus hasten the eventual disintegration of the Soviet Union. The potential massive coordinated Soviet ballistic missile attack, which had been the main driver of the SDIO was no longer considered a viable or likely threat . The need for a missile defense system capable of destroying thousands of incoming nuclear warheads was dissipating. Even the location of the thousands of nuclear warheads and means of delivering them appeared and still appears to be of little concern to the international community.&lt;br/&gt;By the start of 1990 it was generally accepted that the world geo-political situation was changing drastically, and the arrival of perrestroika and glasnost had significantly improved the relationship between the two Superpowers. It was envisaged that some form of joint missile defensive deployment between the Superpowers would be in the interest of both powers and was approached by the USA as a future possibility with Russia. However, the ability of the newly formed country to participate rapidly disintegrated and such avenues remain for the most part unexplored.&lt;br/&gt;A 1990 independent review of the SDIO program authorized by arms control Ambassador Henry F Cooper had warned that tensions within the Soviet Union could lead to accidental and unauthorized launches of ballistic missiles and that the likelihood for such events would tend to increase as time passed. Another concern cited in the study was the proliferation of missile technology and that missiles would be used increasingly more frequently in regional conflicts where USA forces and allies might be involved. It was recommended that the US missile defense program should begin to focus on the provisions for protection against limited missile attacks, and requirements for out of area theater missile defenses.&lt;br/&gt;Ambassador Cooper became the first civilian and the third Director of SDIO later that year. The fundamental correctness of his analysis lead to the views proffered within his report being vigorously promoted by the SDIO leading up to the to and during the Iraq invasion of Kuwait. The ensuing Gulf War which proved these views correct triggered two major effects on the SDI program. One lead to an aggressive Theater Missile Defense program and the other continues at the center of a USA national debate on the deployment of a National Missile Defense system.&lt;br/&gt;Graphic real time videos and photographs of ballistic missiles falling upon Israeli and Saudi Arabian cities and the subsequent damage, had suddenly brought home to many Americans the fact that the ballistic missile threat was not just a Star Wars generated specter, but did indeed exist and was proving to be an immediate danger to their military personnel serving overseas and to their friends in foreign countries. This situation prompted Congress to order the Department of Defense to accelerate its program for a limited Nation Missile Defense.&lt;br/&gt;Support for this policy was destined to last just a few years in the Democratic lead Congress once the war had ended. However; the Republican lead Congress, elected during the President Clinton presidential victory has again placed the need for such a system at the forefront of the national agenda and debate. The second, and presently enduring effect, endorsed by both the President Clinton and Congress, has been an increased emphasis on Theater Missile Defenses.&lt;br/&gt;Very soon after the Gulf War's first air defense Patriot engagement against the SCUD ballistic missile, President Bush called for the USA to refocus its SDIO program. The new focus evolved be an architecture known as Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). It would comprise integrated ground based theater defenses, ground based national defenses, and an overarching space based global defensive system. The concept was aimed at providing a global defense against accidental, unauthorized, and limited strategic and theater missile attacks. Such a capability would not only allow the USA to protect the continental United States, but also any other nation's territory from any aggressor. GPALS was to comprise three related programs which were:&lt;br/&gt;	•	    a Theater Missile Defense with associated space based sensors                                                 for protection of USA forces and their allies deployed abroad.&lt;br/&gt;	•	    a National Missile Defense (NMD) ground based defense with associated space based sensors to protect the USA against strategic ballistic missiles, and&lt;br/&gt;	•	    a Brilliant Pebble space based interceptor system capable of providing continuous global coverage against ballistic missiles from all ballistic missile threats.&lt;br/&gt;It was recognized that complete deployment of the total system would require the modification of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, but it was believed that the growing threat of third world countries was of mutual concern and as such Russia would also find it in its interest to move beyond the treaty. Brilliant Pebbles formed the basis for the GPALS space based interceptor layer, whereby one thousand Brilliant Pebbles distributed in low earth orbit could, on receipt of a command or as a result of their own detection, come out of orbit and intercept ballistic missiles during their boost phase. Other elements in the architecture were to include:&lt;br/&gt;	•	    a new space-based sensor called Brilliant Eyes (BE) now known as Space and Missile Tracking System (SMTS),&lt;br/&gt;	•	    a ground based interceptor to be chosen from two competing concepts which included:&lt;br/&gt;	•	    an exo and endo atmospheric interceptor (E2I) for high altitude interceptions within the earth's atmosphere where discrimination between nuclear warheads and penetration aids is easiest, and&lt;br/&gt;	•	    an exo atmospheric GBI, which would intercept its targets outside of the atmosphere thus avoiding stressing surveillance requirements, but suffered from the necessity of discriminating between objects in space.&lt;br/&gt;This ambitious plan for GPALS eventually fell out of favor for a variety of technical and political reasons. It offered more than enough for a entry level system in an attempt to keep all political, military and industry agendas fulfilled. Consequently it was again considered costly in the face of a threat which was perceived as disappearing. While often attributed to the Clinton Administration, the eventual demise of GPALS had started some two years earlier when support was declining with Congress expressing reservations about any concept which included space based weapons. Congress was further concerned about the continued military requirement for a GPALS strategic defense system leading to more extensive ground based and space based defensive deployment. The start of a new defensive arms race might ensue by provoking Soviet responses that would require further, ever increasing USA investment in improved defenses.&lt;br/&gt;It was also lobbied that limited ground based defenses could provide a more cost effective means of national defense than would space based interceptors like Brilliant Pebbles. The fact that only two hundred high velocity space based interceptors would have completely surpressed the SCUD ballistic missile launches of the Gulf war was not considered viable during the debate.&lt;br/&gt;Congress during 1991 again considered the need for space based weapons and potential advantages offered by a Brilliant Pebbles global coverage, and a second layer of defense for the USA in addition to ground based interceptors. But this argument was not considered to be very compelling, on the grounds that Brilliant Pebbles would have no capability against missiles, other than ballistic, that did not reach outside of the atmosphere. As such, ground based defenses would still be needed for theater defense scenarios comprising threats with ranges of up to eight hundred kilometers. Longer range depressed trajectory attacks with ballistic missiles were also considered beyond the ability of the space based interceptor.&lt;br/&gt;In addition limited area ground based defenses were shown to be less expensive than space based assets when defending theater areas and would themselves be capable of providing more than one layer of defense with more than one attempt at an intercept. The general conclusion at the time was that Brilliant Pebbles would not make a unique contribution and offered no advantage over the perceived less expensive ground based system. Other input to the debate stated that SDIO was deferring ground based programs that could be available in the near term in favor of pursuing the much longer term space based options. The USA would unnecessarily be undefended until well into the next century.&lt;br/&gt;Recently, several USA Foundations have come forward explaining that when moving from local theater area to wide area or national coverage that the cost equations change. Once deployed, a space based system can cover all theaters and the nation, at a fraction of the cost for a total area coverage based on deploying ground based systems for a unknown threat from anywhere in the world. In a similar manner, a second candidate system has also emerged in which a forward deployed USA Navy can also intercept at or near the boost phase of a ballistic missile. Perhaps the continuing debate will be decided when one properly considers where the deadly plutonium or bacteria laden cloud descends after a successful interception. With the space based interceptor one chooses the enemy during boost phase and with the ground based interceptor it falls upon the defender during the final terminal phase of the ballistic missile weapon.&lt;br/&gt;.&lt;br/&gt;Ground Based Defense&lt;br/&gt;During the GPALS period the UK and again Gorbochev's Russia were invited, by President Bush, to participate in the program. Little appears to have been reported with regard to the UK response or enthusiasm for the program. By the end of 1992, but still prior to the election of President Clinton, Congress amended the Gulf War mandated missile defense act which had called upon the Secretary of Defense to &amp;quot;aggressively pursue the development for deployment&amp;quot; of a limited National Defense by 1996 or as soon as was technically feasible. The requirement for fielding a limited National Missile Defense by 1996 was dropped and language was added that placed greater emphasis on Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty compliance.&lt;br/&gt;By March 1991, the final transition had begun and a reorganization within SDIO established a new Directorate for Theater Missile Defense, and as such elevated the new organization to the same level as the National missile Defense Directorate. Also by the spring of 1992 Program Executive Officers had been set up in Air Force, Army and Navy military services, which along with a SDIO General Manager assumed overall responsibility for the acquisition and fielding of all USA missile defense systems. The transition of the SDS Phase One through the GPALS and on to a program concentrating on Theater Missile Defense systems and their acquisition had been well established by the end of President Bush's term in office.&lt;br/&gt;Theater Missile Defense Acquisition&lt;br/&gt;The election of President Clinton speeded the program conversion from National Missile Defense research and development to Theater Missile Defense acquisition. Within one year of his taking office in 1993, the previous trend towards more emphasis on Theater Missile Defense was being fully implemented. Indeed the fiscal year 1993 budget for Theater Missile Defense had increased more than ten fold to Fifteen billion dollars per year. By March, principally in response to experiences gained during the Gulf War, a Department of Defense Bottom Up Review had been commissioned in order to provide a framework for the future USA multi-year security plan. While the review was still in progress the new Defense Secretary, Les Aspin, announced yet another reorganization of SDIO, which brought with it a change in name to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). It was stressed that this change signaled the end of the Star Wars era. The change to BMDO was followed shortly after a change in its UK sister organization's name from SDIPO to the Directorate of Science Ballistic Missile Defense, DSc(BMD).&lt;br/&gt;This coincided with Lt. Gen. Malcolm O'Neill of the USA Army. being appointed the first Director of BMDO and the fourth in the succession of the SDIO leadership.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;The BMDO Shield&lt;br/&gt;Because of the learned Gulf War maximum for defense against SCUD ballistic missiles: &amp;quot;The Army had terminal tract and missiles so they shot, the Navy had mid-course track but no missiles and they did not shoot and the Air Force had boost track but no missiles and they also did not shoot&amp;quot; both the Air Force and the Navy regarded the BMDO office in a new light of a urgent need and soon strongly influenced the content of the BMDO program.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Defense from the Air&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Defense from the Sea&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Defense from the Land&lt;br/&gt;The effect of the Bottom Up Review was soon felt by the BMDO. One of its recommendations being a reduction in the ballistic missile defense five year funding profile from the Thirty nine billion dollars originally sought by the previous administration to just Eighteen billion dollars. The profile was broken down as follows: Twelve billion dollars for Theater Missile Defense, Three billion dollars for National Missile Defense, and Three billion dollars for A research and development program known as &amp;quot;Technology Readiness&amp;quot;.&lt;br/&gt;The Department of Defense subsequently reduced the total figure by a further One billion dollars with most of the cuts coming in the area of Theater Missile Defense. This trend has continued up to and including the fiscal year 1996 budget. This may only be retarded by the current Republican leadership in Congress. The emphasis had clearly changed with the thrust of the program shifting toward the aim of fielding effective Theater Missile Defense systems in the shortest possible time. The program is also to maintain and provide a basis for rapidly deploying a national defense should a threat to the fifty states of USA materialize. The ballistic missile defense program now comprises three clearly definable near term elements:&lt;br/&gt;an Theater Missile Defense comprising: the four programs:&lt;br/&gt;PATRIOT improvements including PAC-3 incorporating an Extended Range Interceptor.&lt;br/&gt;Theater High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD)&lt;br/&gt;Navy Lower Tier utilizing Standard Missile II Block IVA boosters&lt;br/&gt;Navy wide area upper tier system utilizing the Standard Missile II Block IV boosters with an upper kick stage and hit to kill warhead technology&lt;br/&gt;and the advanced projects which include the cooperative Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) and boost phase interdiction by aircraft lasers or air launched interceptors.&lt;br/&gt;an National Missile Defense program, which is continues at a much reduced level of research funding and is now conducted on a deployment readiness basis whereby sufficient preparation is to be achieved to give the US a capability to quickly develop and deploy defenses for the protection of the USA when the need arises,and&lt;br/&gt;a Technology Readiness research and development program at a much reduced level of funding aimed at identifying future enhancements to Theater Missile Defense systems while also contributing to National Missile Defense technology readiness.&lt;br/&gt;It has been seen that progress in technology allowed the USA to an affordable acquisition predominant program through an unexpected but not surprising route. In 1992 it was realized that miniaturization and high technology by the nature allowed retrofit of existing Air Defense weapon systems to the role of ballistic missile defense.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Standard Missile Retrofit&lt;br/&gt;Air Defense systems such as the Army PATRIOT and the Navy Standard Missile with launcher and surveillance infrastructure, with attendant sunk costs of some Sixty billion dollars, could be reconfigured for the ballistic missile defense role. With relatively minor changes, the system of systems already exists. This insight also resulted in a surfeit of Theater Missile Defense candidate systems. USA Department of Defense officials are convinced that some will be delayed with the advanced theater technology programs subsequently finding it difficult to break into the acquisition program list.&lt;br/&gt;Developments and Trends&lt;br/&gt;The resurgence of Republican power in Congress since the elections of 1994 has resulted in a more focused Congressional attention towards the need for a National Missile Defense. This resulted in additional funding being allocated in the fiscal year 1996 Authorization Bill. An extra Four hundred and fifty million dollars for 1996 has been recommended which is more than two thirds of the total Ballistic Missile Defense increase earmarked in the bill.&lt;br/&gt;It was primarily the National Missile Defense language associated with the increase that convinced President Clinton to return the bill to Congress unsigned, in December 1995, which in turn led to a Congressional deletion of the offending language. In any event the proposed increase remains a nominal amount, which would fall short of the amount necessary to achieve the requirement to &amp;quot;be ready for deployment by the year 2003&amp;quot;. One of a number of current BMDO proposals for spending the fiscal year 1996 increase subject to the money eventually being approved, is to spread it over two years and then request a further One hundred million dollars per year for fiscal years 1997 and 1998.&lt;br/&gt;Such a plan would move the program beyond the current technology readiness philosophy in order to meet the Congressional mandated more aggressive deployment schedule. The election later this year of a new Republican President would provide added emphasis to the National Missile Defense; but, the election of a Democratic Congress would further complicate the debate. Given the cost required to deploy a National Missile Defense system early in the next century and the acceptance by all concerned that Theater Missile Defense must retain top priority, even a change in leadership is unlikely to result in anything more than an acceleration or refinement to the current Technology Readiness Program.&lt;br/&gt;A return to the Star Wars type of architecture is unlikely given that the break-up of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact now appears irreversible. Also any National Missile Defense system, be it deployable or just in readiness for deployment, will first be based on a surface based interceptor with ground and space based sensors and an effective USA national BMC3 system. Space based weapons whether they are interceptors or laser driven space based directed energy weapons will remain politically unacceptable even as costs and technology risk are shown to be at the a minimum for a robust coverage of the threat from all quarters. Currently research activities are funding such laser research for the defense role at a nominal rate of Seventy million dollars per year.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Directed Energy Weapons&lt;br/&gt;One key National Missile Defense issue is the identification of a real threat to the USA from Inter-continental Ballistic Missiles. Opinion is divided within the USA. Republicans in Congress are accused of generating a much more alarmist threat than is being offered by the intelligence organizations of the USA, NATO, and the UK. These sources admit the possibility of; but discount the buy and fly approach as opposed to self development used by past users of offensive Ballistic Missiles.&lt;br/&gt;On a continuing path of excellance in leadership, Lt. Gen. Lester Lyles of the USA Air Forcehas recently been named the fifth Director of the BMDO and SDIO. He will lead the organization into this next century of certain unforseen changes in the consideration of ballistic missile systems.&lt;br/&gt;In Retrospect and Anticipation&lt;br/&gt;The metamorphosis of SDI into Theater Missile Defense acquisition now seems to have been the obvious and inevitable outcome given the costs, technological challenge and risk,political objections associated with Star Wars, and the influence of the ABM Treaty. The path was even used in an internal document &amp;quot;Theater Missile Defense to GPALS a Progressive Deployment &amp;quot; first presented in 1990. The inevitability of the transition is well illustrated by the fact that the change to Theater Missile Defense, and in effect BMDO to a procurement agency, often accredited to the Clinton Administration had started much earlier during the Bush period.&lt;br/&gt;Even during the early days of SDIO there was significant world resistance, to include internal USA skepticism from mostly the uninformed who felt that SDIO comprised a bunch of mad scientists chasing the unattainable. The Soviet Union and The People's Republic of China have always shown significant interest and concern and often warned that Star Wars type space based defense would destabilize world military balance. Some would say that the spector was by itself responsible for a complete collapse of the Soviet Union Superpower. China reportedly still fears and opposes any form of space based strategic defenses.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Air Craft Laser Concept&lt;br/&gt;It is likely, that any attempt to return to space based weapons in future, albeit unlikely, would result in world wide political resistance and resentment from all but those nations closely involved in the program. This will continue until the unthinkable loss of a city occurs and the need for the only affordable robust global protection solution is at hand.&lt;br/&gt;Much criticism has been and continues to be, directed at SDIO and BMDO because of some Thirty five billion dollars spent so far, mainly on research and development, with no defensive system in place. For example, by the time the Nuclear Ballistic Missile Offense and ship based AEGIS systems had spent a like amount, the USA had put Fifteen Hundred land based nuclear missiles into silos and had deployed Thirty eight AEGIS guided missile cruisers. But such criticism is largely unfair given that decisions to deploy have been stopped time and again by changing world conditions. Deployment of some upgraded equipment has already been acomplished in the PAC-2 guidance enhanced missile. Also PAC-3, THAAD and the improved Hawk system are now quite close to being fielded.&lt;br/&gt;Moreover, it is now generally accepted that it was the SDI program and the USSR's inability to keep pace with it helped cause the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. In addition, much of the research and development data has been made available to all civilian research establishments, industry, and academia, where it has been applied to many technological programs including: adaptive optics, medical research and surgical techniques, novel computer processing, electronic chip design and manufacturing techniques and food preservation methods. Many more examples are available. It is also notable that BMDO's efforts towards establishing dual technologies for its programs has enabled hundreds of new private commercial enterprises to be set up within the USA, which in turn has lead to reduced costs, and mature technology for future defense utilization.&lt;br/&gt;.&lt;br/&gt;Air Launched for Altitude&lt;br/&gt;With hindsight, the USA underestimated the durability and influence of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the resistance experienced when attempting to amend it even though one of the signatories no longer exists. Statements during the 1991 Congressional debates on GPALS such as &amp;quot;at most we may need very modest changes in the treaty's numerical limits that might well be mutually agreeable with the Soviet Union;&amp;quot; and &amp;quot;the Soviet Union may well share our interest in defending against a regional missile threat&amp;quot;, suggest a misunderstanding of Russia's indifference to any such change. Even now, in the much more improved post cold war climate, negotiations are only just inching towards agreement regarding the Theater Mssile Defense systems, which the treaty did not cover.&lt;br/&gt;In the near term the 1972 ABM Treaty will continue to have a significant influence on ballistic missile defense progress even though it isconsidered unlikely that the treaty will survive far into the next century. The USA stated intention is to deploy a National Missile Defense system to protect the entire USA once any rogue or unstable nation has the capability to deploy or demonstrates an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile. What will replace the ABM Treaty can only be the subject of speculation, but should the threat emerge a new treaty is likely to be considered beneficial to both the US and Russia. In fact, it is more likely that a move away from a bilateral agreement will be necessary as both nations may need to consider the possibility that within the next years, developments in missile technology could be such that a country such as China would be able to develop or even deploy an ballistic missile defense system. The form of any such future treaty is likely to be centered around the form that weapons in space should take since they are demonstrable the most affordable path to take in a new world order.&lt;br/&gt;Since the Reagan keynote speech of 1983, UK and US cooperation with the SDIO and BMDO has been steady. Very early on in 1984, the USA President and the UK Prime Minister, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, had reached agreement on a joint policy for the future of Ballistic Missile Defense. There has been a special relationship between the ballistic missile communities of both nations and UK access to the USA program appears to have been a lot easier for the UK compared to other US allies. It is also true that the special relationship still exists, but also undeniable that some erosion is now in progress,and unless the UK deems a Ballistic Missile Defense a national priority a decline that will likely continue in future. The strong ties between the scientific communities is also weakening now that the USA programs are turning to the acquisition cycle.&lt;br/&gt;At the same time other international relationships are developing: Japan is much favored by the current USA administration and may ultimately want to be part of a Theater Missile Defense program. Holland is considering the procurement of a Theater Missile Defense capability. Israel has an established relationship with the US and in effect a joint program in the form of the ARROW ground launched missile defense development. The USA already has a commitment to Europe, with the notable exception of the UK, with regard to the Medium Extended Air Defense System program. The three latter programs have procurement as a final objective, something that to date the UK has been unable to promise its USA counterparts.&lt;br/&gt;Future UK and US cooperation will be dependent to a large extent on the outcome of the 1996 Ballistic Missile UK Pre-Feasibility Study and subsequent policy decisions in the UK government. But with the USA finances becoming increasingly harder to come by, with the fiscal year 1996 plus up not with standing, new cooperation may prove to be harder to negotiate by the UK.&lt;br/&gt;One entry will center around the USA National Missile Defense program and the potential utilization of the Fylingdales radar. Other possibilities include joint trials with a UK S-Band radar named MESAR; the lethality work carried out by CBDE that, because of environmentalist pressures, cannot be achieved within the US. Other already well established joint ventures are regarded by BMDO to offer many benefits to its program. These include: the Target Orientation and Tracking Systems, Artificial Intelligence Discrimination Architecture, BMC3 and the very successful joint wargames at USA National Test Facility that offers the USA much in terms of assessing differences in doctrine between nations.&lt;br/&gt;Any perception of a lack of UK commitment to Ballistic Missile Defense could easily have a serious negative effect on any potential for cooperation, and the Medium Extended Air Defense System experience, good or bad, will have a significant effect on future US cooperation with its allies. The current USA position on the Theater Missile Defense acquisition and advanced technology programs are reasonably well established. But the picture for future acquisition and eventual deployment is still not completely clear. Of the four acquisition programs PAC-3 and Navy Lower Tier currently appear nearest at hand. The advanced technology programs; however, are not doing so well, as the Boost Phase Laser and Interceptor programs are currently moribund. Likewise, Medium Extended Air Defense System has no guarantee that it will continue beyond the preliminary design phases of the program.. THAAD, which only a few months ago was BMDO's showcase system, has more recently been cast under a shadow due to high costs and problems in the flight test program. Talk of an eventual &amp;quot;fly-off&amp;quot; between the THAAD and Navy Theater Wide systems does, seem warranted in some quarters.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;THAAD System Missile Launch&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;THAAD System Radar&lt;br/&gt;Given the investment requirements for new radars and interceptors in the THAAD system, the use of the existing Navy Air Defense infrastructure to fly a new front end technology set certainly would allow a more cost efficient solution for a first advanced Ballistic Missile system. The strong desire to stave-off criticism by actually fielding an operational system as soon as possible leave a retrofitted Navy system well in position for a program ahead.. The basic problem is a simple and common one of insufficient finance. A shortfall of as much as one billion dollars per year for ballistic missile defense was being predicted by many top ranking Department of Defense officials. Perhaps more seriously, senior military leaders for all services are now beginning to suggest that the Theater Missile Defense effort has and will continue to drain much needed resources for other more basic military modernization programs.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Standard Missile Launch&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;Navy Vertical Launch&lt;br/&gt;The outcome to the current debate has been a restructured THAAD program aimed at reducing costs by increasing the focus on the current Demonstration and Validation Phase and modifying the requirement specification for deployed systems such that the User Operational Evaluation System will become the operational system. A program of product improvements would then follow as and when the threat dictates, leading ultimately to a more stringent performance specification. With PAC-3 expected to be fully deployed by 2001, and with the current strength of support for Navy Upper Tier growing, the way ahead is more fully evident. The apparent USA Congressional dislike of cooperative programs, Medium Extended Air Defense System would appear to the UK to be the most likely loser should a decision to cut a program become inevitable.&lt;br/&gt;In Conclusion&lt;br/&gt;The key events and subsequent decisions which led the US to change from an organization building SDS Phase One to GPALS to the current Theater Missile Defense acquisition program have been identified. Contention that such changes could be solely attributed to the Clinton Administration were dispelled. The effects those changes had on the program and UK's involvement in it has been considered The program achievements to date and potential for future progress were also briefly mentioned. The current Department of Defense review of ballistic missile defense systems attaches increased priority to the deployment of lower tier Theater Missile Defense systems of PAC-3 and the Navy Lower Tier in order to provide protection for theater forces against what is considered to be the &amp;quot;here and now&amp;quot; threat from Ballistic missiles.&lt;br/&gt;&lt;br/&gt;A Documented Growing Threat&lt;br/&gt;At the same time it allows for continued upper tier development, and preparation for a possible National Missile Defense deployment when the future threat dictates. As a result the Clinton Administration appears to have come up with a balanced program for the future, which could offer some degree of stability and even growth with support of the Congress .The future for ballistic missile defense programs in the USA still leaves a lot yet to be played for, particularly in the National Missile Defense and the theater upper tier arenas. Although such views are not necessarily shared by the current administration, there is continuing frustration within the BMDO and associated agencies over the lack of allies and even a global lack in acknowledging a threat or a commitment to sharing the deployment of ballistic missile defenses. Global developments in the use of the ballistic missile threat will undoubtedly set the direction of the program over the next decades as they has done in the past.&lt;br/&gt;The End&lt;br/&gt; </description>
      <itunes:block>yes</itunes:block>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Image Research Center</title>
      <link>/classic/BSL/Papers/Entries/2006/9/11_Image_Research_Center.html</link>
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      <pubDate>Mon, 11 Sep 2006 15:58:01 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;br/&gt;This proposal outlines how to complete the initial planning for an Image Research Center to be located in Southern Maryland.  This center would become a clearinghouse for innovative image and data interrogation technical approaches and sponsor leading edge technological research by its own scientific staff and at various academic, industrial, and defense laboratories. </description>
      <itunes:block>yes</itunes:block>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Boost Phase Brief</title>
      <link>/classic/BSL/Papers/Entries/2006/9/11_Boost_Phase_Brief.html</link>
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      <pubDate>Mon, 11 Sep 2006 08:43:57 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;br/&gt;An approach is detailed for addressing the technology issues for adding capability to boost phase intercept for missile defense.   The use of ground , sea, air or space basing provides a general backdrop for the direction of the technical base program.  From these basing modes, the sea based option is used to provide rationale for the near system drivers for planning a technology capability.&lt;br/&gt;</description>
      <itunes:block>yes</itunes:block>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Aegis Boost Phase Defense</title>
      <link>/classic/BSL/Papers/Entries/2006/9/11_Aegis_Boost_Phase_Defense.html</link>
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      <pubDate>Mon, 11 Sep 2006 06:07:30 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>&lt;br/&gt;An approach is detailed for addressing the technology issues for adding capability to boost phase intercept for missile defense.   The use of ground , sea, air or space basing provides a general backdrop for the direction of the technical base program.  From these basing modes, the sea based option is used to provide rationale for the near system drivers for planning a technology capability.</description>
      <itunes:block>yes</itunes:block>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Navy Missile Defense Brief</title>
      <link>/classic/BSL/Papers/Entries/2006/9/10_Navy_Missile_Defense_Brief.html</link>
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      <pubDate>Sun, 10 Sep 2006 22:03:14 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>The Navy has assumed a major role in missile defense.   They will be the first responders and are in place around he world.   The  Navy has the capacity, with the self contained Aegis weapon systems, to meet the missile threat from anywhere.  The viable technology and management paths are in place to meet the requirements.  The great constant is the systematic production of  “Three Surface Combatants” per year with planned upgrades as a routine part of the Navy Aegis program.</description>
      <itunes:block>yes</itunes:block>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Precision Feature Extraction</title>
      <link>/classic/BSL/Papers/Entries/2006/9/10_Precision_Feature_Extraction.html</link>
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      <pubDate>Sun, 10 Sep 2006 20:25:50 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>The serial processing of digital central processing units can be replaced by pixel net processing units capable of massive parallel image processing.  The manufacturing technology is similar, but the power requirements and numbers of processors to accomplish the same task are reduced by orders of magnitude. For military applications, this technology will allow power and weight reductions for processors on board aircraft and their weapons. It will provide the opportunity for improved performance at lower cost for major sub components of weapon systems. </description>
      <itunes:block>yes</itunes:block>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Pixelnet Lightweight Avionics</title>
      <link>/classic/BSL/Papers/Entries/2006/9/10_Pixelnet_Lightweight_Avionics.html</link>
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      <pubDate>Sun, 10 Sep 2006 19:51:49 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>Flight system programs at he Missile Defense Agency including the Airship, the Globalhawk and Space Based Interceptors have a common goal in obtaining avionics at lighter weight and lower power consumption.  This pathfinder program will quantify and demonstrate the use of the pixelnet computer to achieve these enabling sub system performance improvements in he reduction in weight and power requirements .</description>
      <itunes:block>yes</itunes:block>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>System Weight Reduction</title>
      <link>/classic/BSL/Papers/Entries/2006/9/10_System_Weight_Reduction.html</link>
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      <pubDate>Sun, 10 Sep 2006 18:59:21 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>The emerging pixelnet family of  retinal based architecture computers will revolutionize how sensor broadband data is interrogated in future weapon systems.  Regardless of the sensors array, whether it feeds actively or passively obtained data, these systems will be made more sensitive.  This will be achieved with major reduction in hardware part counts and part weight reductions of sub systems required to do these tasks.</description>
      <itunes:block>yes</itunes:block>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Retinal Image Processor</title>
      <link>/classic/BSL/Papers/Entries/2006/9/10_Retinal_Image_Processor.html</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">a7add9c2-d108-478e-bc72-e791d5ec0173</guid>
      <pubDate>Sun, 10 Sep 2006 16:20:28 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>The rapid growth in the availability and use of real time broadband image data has outstripped the ability to extract in realtime meaningful information buried in the image data stream. The military need for spacial, temporal and spectral analysis of images has led to a proliferation of programs requiring larger and larger digital computers.</description>
      <itunes:block>yes</itunes:block>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Destin Broadband Proposal</title>
      <link>/classic/BSL/Papers/Entries/2006/9/1_Destin_Broadband_Proposal.html</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">11aa7af1-22c3-442b-810a-a0c09ac2f642</guid>
      <pubDate>Fri, 1 Sep 2006 20:36:23 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>Destin Florida is a place uniquely suited for free wide band and computer internet access for its citizens.  The influx of tourists with their requirements for internet hook ups is the key for this opportunity.  Of particular interest is the purchasing of a laptop computer for every student in Destin and eventually all those in Okaloosa County. This proposal suggests an approach for implementing such a service.</description>
      <itunes:block>yes</itunes:block>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Heritage Missile Defense</title>
      <link>/classic/BSL/Papers/Entries/2006/8/15_Heritage_Missile_Defense.html</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">9e152670-64c9-4ed7-b0b6-d2025f887578</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Aug 2006 12:05:58 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>A program for the minorities.</description>
      <itunes:block>yes</itunes:block>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Advanced Concept Cell</title>
      <link>/classic/BSL/Papers/Entries/2006/8/14_Advanced_Concept_Cell.html</link>
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      <pubDate>Mon, 14 Aug 2006 17:18:40 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>The Advanced Concept Innovation Cell had as its goal the identification and development of technologies for future missile defense systems.</description>
      <itunes:block>yes</itunes:block>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Space-Based Interceptor Propulsion</title>
      <link>/classic/BSL/Papers/Entries/1993/6/28_Space_Based_Interceptor_Propulsion.html</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">0f72cdb2-43cf-5158-8359-a1c91ae812a3</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 28 Jun 1993 09:00:00 -0500</pubDate>
      <description>This paper assesses the potential payoffs of using low-weight, high-performance interceptor propulsion technology, developed for missile defense, for satellites and interplanetary vehicles.</description>
      <itunes:block>yes</itunes:block>
      <itunes:explicit>no</itunes:explicit>
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